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Abstract 
A commitment to the rule of law is a commitment to the governance of a 
society through the use of general or generalizable rules which are binding on 
both the subjects and the rulers.  By giving due notice of the rules and of any 
changes to them, those who are subject to the law are protected from violence 
and enabled to act as agents.  This is the essential contribution the rule of law 
makes to important human goods including freedom.  Such an understanding 
of the rule of law illuminates why the law-like character of God and the 
revelation of God’s law make human free will meaningful and a relationship 
of love between God and human beings possible.  A commitment to the rule of 
law also means that those exercising power have to offer justifications to 
explain why the rules are binding, which opens up space for debate about 
whether the rules are just.   
 
                                                




I want to take you today into a strange land, into the land of legal philosophy.  
It is a strange land because debates within legal philosophy have become 
unhealthily isolated from a broad or long-term understanding of intellectual 
history.  If Carl Schmitt was even half-right about political theory being a 
secular reflection of political theology,1 then one would expect theological 
insights to enrich and illuminate a debate within legal philosophy regarding 
the rule of law.  A more surprising outcome of our journey is that, I hope, we 
will find insights on our travels which illuminate our understanding of God. 
 
The traditional Christian view of natural law sees human law-making and 
judging as specifications and clarifications of natural law and divine law, both 
of which have their origins in God.  This view of law was regarded by the 
legal positivists as both muddle-headed and dangerous.  It was muddle-headed 
because it confused law as it is with law as it ought to be.2  It was dangerous 
because it created a presumption that laws were good and ought to be obeyed.  
The result was that in practice, despite the insistence of natural law theorists 
that an unjust law ought not to be obeyed, it bred an unhealthy deference to 
authority. 
 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the legal positivists 
dominated the field of legal philosophy: it became axiomatic that law was just 
a tool, which could be wielded for evil purposes just as easily as it could be 
used in the pursuit of good ends.   
 
Then, in the middle of the twentieth century, Lon L. Fuller said that there was 
an intrinsic discipline to making law and that this discipline amounted to a 
‘procedural natural law’,3 though he insisted that it had ‘nothing to do with 
                                                
1 C. Schmitt, tr. George Schwab, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of 
Sovereignty (London: MIT Press, 1985). 
2 This was the fundamental criticism made by John Austin, who tried to combine divine 
command theory, utilitarianism and legal positivism in The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined, (London, 1832).  
3 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, revd. edn. 1969), 
pp. 96-97. 
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any “brooding omnipresence in the skies”’ and that it was ‘entirely terrestrial 
in origin and application’.   
 
Fuller ‘was concerned to show that even modern law – which is highly open to 
diverse contents and political programmes – serves a necessary minimal moral 
value.’4 Fuller’s claim was that in order to govern by law, there were at least 
eight matters to be considered:  
(1) rules should be general or generalizable,5  
(2) rules must be publicised,  
(3) rules must not be retroactive,  
(4) rules must be understandable,  
(5) rules must not be contradictory,  
(6) rules must not require the impossible,  
(7) rules must not be changed so frequently that ‘the subject cannot 
orient cannot orient his action by them’, and  
(8) there must be ‘congruence between the rules as announced and 
their actual administration’.6   
 
What Fuller identified as a set of procedures for law-making are better 
described as a set of formal requirements for law; they are practices which 
give law the distinctive form that it takes as a method of social organisation. 
 
The legal positivists retorted that Fuller had mistaken effectiveness for 
goodness; that the discipline of law-making did not mean that law was 
inherently more suited for good purposes than for evil ones, all that he had 
done was to identify what you have to do if you want law to work for you as a 
tool.7  Despite accepting that “many of the more common manifestations of 
power run foul of the rule of law”,8 ‘Joseph Raz famously argued that [the rule 
of law is] only instrumentally valuable, making law “good” in the same way 
                                                
4 Rivers, ‘The Rule of Law as Civic Virtue’, in R. Heimburger ed. The Modern State and the 
Kingdom of God (Oxford: Las Casas Institute, 2012), pp. 1-8 at p.2. 
5 Legislation characteristically takes the form of general rules; case-law characteristically 
takes the form of generalizable rules.  
6 Fuller, The Morality of Law, p. 39. 
7 H.L.A. Hart, the greatest legal positivist of the twentieth century, opposed Fuller’s position 
at Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 2nd edn, 1994), p. 207. Recent scholarship 
has, however, demonstrated that although Hart purported to disagree with Fuller, on some 
occasions he appears to concede Fuller’s point that the rule of law has a moral value whilst at 
other times he maintains his denial: J. Waldron, ‘Positivism and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal 
Response to Fuller’, New York University Law Review 83 (2008), pp. 1135-1169. 
8 J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon, 2nd edn, 
2009), p.219. 
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that a sharp knife is good, in other words, fit for purpose.’9  In Raz’s own case 
this assessment of the rule of law as neutral was qualified beyond the point of 
equivocation because Raz accepted that “the rule of law is an inherent virtue 
of law”, and whilst “not a moral virtue of such”, the benefits of conformity to 
the rule of law in restricting “many of the more common manifestations of 
arbitrary power” meant that “the rule of law … is virtually always of great 
moral value.”10  
 
The battle has raged on into the next generation of legal philosophers, dividing 
the law faculty at Cambridge. On the legal positivist side, Matthew Kramer 
has argued that an evil regime could successfully pretend to be governing in 
accordance with the rule of law whilst still perpetrating many serious forms of 
evil.  Even more strongly than Raz, Kramer has asserted that the rule of law is 
a purely instrumental value, as serviceable for evil as for good.11  Central to 
Kramer’s thesis is the idea that the officials in a wicked regime could have 
sufficient prudential, i.e. self-regarding, reasons for complying with the rule of 
law in pursuit of their iniquitous ends.12  
 
Taking up Fuller’s baton, Nigel Simmonds disagrees, contending instead that 
the rule of law is an inherently moral idea.13 Although some serious forms of 
evil could be perpetrated in a society which is governed by the rule of law, 
other types of evil are inhibited by the rule of law and that makes the rule of 
law valuable as a moral ideal in its own right. Simmonds is one of a number of 
contemporary legal philosophers who argue that there is, inherent to law as a 
social institution, a moral virtue called ‘legality’ which is distinct from the 
virtue of justice which Christian natural law theory regarded as the essence of 
law. 
 
                                                
9 Rivers, ‘The Rule of Law as Civic Virtue’, p.2; referring to the argument of Raz, The 
Authority of Law, p.226. 
10 Raz, The Authority of Law, p.226. 
11 M. Kramer ‘On the Moral Status of the Rule of Law’, Cambridge Law Journal 63 (2004), 
pp. 65-97. 
12 Kramer, ‘On the Moral Status of the Rule of Law’, pp. 66-77.  Kramer’s claim is not that 
wicked legal officials are in fact driven to comply with the rule of law by purely prudential 
concerns, merely that is logically conceivable and practically possible that they might be. 
13 N.E. Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 34-36. 
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As Raz acknowledged, at the heart of the concept of the rule of law is the idea 
that government is by laws rather than by caprice or unpredictable whim.14  In 
a lecture given in 2006, Tom Bingham, formerly Britain’s senior Law, 
suggested that  
 
‘The core of the existing principle [of the rule of law] is … that all 
persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, 
should be bound by and entitled to the benefits of laws publicly and 
prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the courts’.15   
 
It is this idea which is captured in chapter 29 of the Magna Carta (as re-issued 
by Edward I in 1297) which is one of only three articles still in force in their 
original form:16  
 
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his 
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any 
other wise destroyed, nor will we not pass upon him, nor (condemn 
him,) but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. 
We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either 
justice or right. 
 
That article sets out an understanding of freedom in which to be free is to 
know that your life, liberty and possessions will not be taken away from you 
otherwise than in accordance with the law of the land.  At the time the Magna 
Carta was enacted, to be declared an outlaw was to be deprived of those 
protections so that anyone could kill you with impunity. 
 
Within legal philosophy, the concept of the rule of law comes in thin and thick 
versions.  Fuller’s account is a thin version, according to which a society is 
                                                
14 Rivers, ‘The Living Rule of Law: an essay in virtue jurisprudence’, Law & Justice 174 
(2015), pp.5-34 at p. 6. 
15 Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’, Cambridge Law Journal 66 (2007), p. 69.  He immediately 
qualified that statement by recognising that there are exceptions and qualifications to the 
principle that justice must be done in public, but contended that the force of the principle is 
such that ‘any derogation calls for close consideration and clear justification.’ 
16 The other two being chapter 1 (which relates to the liberties of the church), and chapter 9 
(which relates to the liberties of London and other cities, towns and ports). 
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governed by the rule of law when law is made according to the proper 
procedures and promulgated in the correct forms.  This thin, formal version of 
the rule of law forms the basis for a thicker, substantive version of the rule of 
law in which law is presented in a more idealised fashion.  We will return, 
later in our discussion, to consider why this thickening of the conception of 
the rule of law occurs so frequently. 
 
Tom Bingham offers a recent example of the thick version of the rule of law.17  
His eight principles for the rule of law are: 
 
(1) The law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear 
and predictable; 
(2) Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved 
by application of the law not the exercise of discretion; 
(3) The laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent 
that objective differences justify differentiation; 
(4) Ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers 
conferred on them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose for which 
the powers were conferred, without exceeding the limits of such 
powers and not unreasonably; 
(5) The law must afford adequate protection to fundamental human 
rights; 
(6) Means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or 
inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties 
themselves are unable to resolve; 
(7) Adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair; 
(8)  The rule of law requires compliance by the state with its 
obligations in international law as in national law. 
 
Whilst not quite offering a constitution or a bill of rights, Bingham’s account 
of the rule of law contains a number of substantive values.  
II. The concept of the rule of law 
The modern lineage of the rule of law can be traced back to Thomas Paine’s 
pronouncement in 1776 that ‘in America THE LAW IS KING’18 and before 
that to Samuel Rutherford’s 1644 political treatise Lex, Rex.  The rise of 
political absolutism against which Rutherwood was reacting was a sixteenth 
and seventeenth century aberration.  Before that, the rule of law had been a 
                                                
17 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Penguin, 2011). 
18 Paine Common Sense (1776), (London: Penguin, 2004) p. 279.  
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key idea of Christian natural law theory from Augustine to the High Middle 
Ages.  The doctrine is perhaps most clearly expressed by John of Salisbury 
who, in the twelfth century, argued that ‘Between a tyrant and a prince there is 
this single or chief difference, that the latter obeys the law and rules the people 
by its dictates, accounting himself as but their servant.’ 19  Across nine 
centuries, John of Salisbury and Lord Bingham are united by their conviction 
that the rule of law is the idea that the law binds everyone within the realm, 
including the rulers.   
 
III. The rule of law distinguished from other societies 
The significance of the ways in which the law binds has been reflected on by 
the German legal theorist, Robert Alexy.  His reflections have been provoked 
by a famous question posed by Augustine: 
 
Remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia?  Quia et ipsa 
latrocinia quid sunt nisi parva regna? ‘Justice being taken away, then, what 
are kingdoms but great robberies?  For what are robberies themselves, but 
little kingdoms?’20 
 
Augustine’s question is intriguing.  Because in The City of God he draws a 
resolute, though in my view ultimately wrong-headed, disjunction between 
law and justice,21 Augustine invites an enquiry into what makes a law a law if 
it is not justice.  This enquiry can be undertaken by means of a thought 
experiment, though the consideration of a series of dystopias, or to be more 
precise, a series of dysnomias, of social orders which do not create law or in 
which the rule of law is defective. 
                                                
19 John of Salisbury, (1159) Policraticus. Tr. and ed. Cary Nederman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991).  
20 Augustine, The City of God, Book IV, chapter 4. 
21 D.H. McIlroy, A Trinitarian Theology of Law: in conversation with Jürgen Moltmann, 
Oliver O’Donovan and Thomas Aquinas (Milton Keynes, Paternoster, 2009), pp. 191, 231-
232. 
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A. The senseless order 
Alexy first asks us to imagine a chaotic society which he calls the ‘senseless 
order’. A ‘senseless order’ is a society in which those with power issue 
contradictory, impossible and arbitrary rules from moment to moment.  Such 
‘a senseless order … that neither reveals consistent purposes of the ruler … 
nor makes a continuous pursuit of the subjects’ purposes possible’22  is 
obviously not one which is governed by law.  In this state of affairs, those 
with power do whatever they want, without any logic or consistency to their 
actions.  In the senseless order, it is impossible for subjects to exercise any 
real agency because their purposes are liable to be frustrated at any moment 
by an arbitrary, irrational or impossible command.  
 
B. The robber or slave state 
Now imagine that a new ruler comes to power in the senseless order.  This 
new ruler has no more interest in the well-being of his subjects than his 
predecessor did.  However, the new ruler observes that the arbitrary nature and 
unconstrained power of his predecessor’s rule had made his subjects reluctant 
to plant crops, to start businesses, to form families or to make any long term 
plans, and therefore the state’s economic development had been stunted. 
 
The ruler therefore draws up a system of rules for the sole purpose of 
exploiting his subjects more efficiently.  He issues rules which are binding on 
the subjects but which give them no rights whatsoever against the ruling elite.  
He makes no pretence whatsoever to be governing for the benefit of his 
subjects.  The benefits of increased rationality and predictability which his 
rule delivers to his subjects are simply side-effects of the ruler’s pursuit of his 
own interests. 
 
In practice, such a ruler cannot rule alone.  He will therefore, even if he is 
initially only concerned with achieving his own ends, find it necessary to co-
operate with some others, and to have regard to the interests of his 
                                                
22 R. Alexy, ‘On Necessary Relations between Law and Morality’, Ratio Juris 2 (1989) p. 
176. 
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collaborators, even if his goals are evil.  It is precisely this sort of arrangement 
that Augustine envisages in his band-of-robbers illustration.  After posing his 
rhetorical question, Augustine continues: 
 
‘The band itself is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a 
prince, it is knit together by the pact of confederacy; the booty is 
divided by the law agreed on.   If, by the admittance of abandoned 
men, this evil increases to such a degree that it holds places, fixes 
abodes, takes possession of cities, and subdues people, it assumes the 
more plainly the name of a kingdom, because the reality is now 
manifestly conferred on it, not by the removal of covetousness, but by 
the addition of impunity.’23  
 
The prince claims authority over the robbers and presents his rule as beneficial 
to the robbers.  There is ‘a pact of confederacy’ in accordance with which ‘the 
booty is divided by the law agreed on’.  According to Augustine, social life, 
even amongst a band of robbers, requires the adoption of a rule with regard to 
the internal division of the booty.  Augustine warns, however, that all this may 
be pursued at the expense of those who are not part of the band.  The robber 
state therefore operates as a legal system for those it claims to benefit but it 
does not create law for those upon whom it preys. 
 
The exposure to violence is central to the distinction between the members of 
the robber band and those upon whom they prey.  For the members of the 
robber band, the pact of confederacy means that they are subject to a regime in 
which the imposition of sanctions is certain and the application of violence is 
controlled by the rules.  However, those on whom the band preys are subject 
to a rule in which they are vulnerable to violence at any moment.  On this 
reading, Augustine contends that the rule of law may apply for the benefit of 
some who are affected by the laws whilst at the same time amounting to 
nothing more than violence towards those who are only exploited by the laws.   
 
                                                
23 Augustine, City of God, book IV, chapter 4.  
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Precisely this situation exists where there is a regime which permits chattel-
slavery.  Chattel-slaves do not enjoy any protection against violence, they are 
not free to hold any property of their own, and they do not have any standing 
or legal personality of their own.  Denied any protection against violence and 
any (share in) property rights, chattel slaves are neither subject to the rule of 
law nor under any moral obligation to obey the ruler’s commands.  For them, 
the regime is not a legal system it is a regime of unrestrained violence. 
 
The chattel-slaves’ plight is not just that they are the victims of unrestrained 
violence and that their property is insecure.  Like outlaws, they are treated as 
objects not subjects.  As the American legal philosopher John Rawls puts it:  
 
‘slaves are human beings who are not counted as sources of claims, not 
even claims based on social duties or obligations, for slaves are not 
counted as capable of having duties or obligations.  Laws that prohibit 
the abuse and maltreatment of slaves are not founded on claims made 
by slaves on their own behalf, but on claims originating either from 
slaveholders, or from the general interests of society (which does not 
include the interests of slaves).  Slaves are, so to speak, socially dead: 
they are not publicly recognized as persons at all.’24 
 
Robber and slave states are ruled over by elites.  As between the sovereign 
and the other members of the elite, a legal system may exist.  What the 
dysnomias of the senseless order and the robber or slave state reveal is that for 
the victims of such regimes to be exposed to unrestrained violence is to exist 
outside the rule of law. 
C. The managerial order 
Thus far in our thought experiment we have seen how the rule of law controls 
the incidence of violence.  That is, however, only one half of the story.  Fuller 
identified another form of social order where law is not essential: the 
managerial order such as a factory or a concentration camp. 
                                                
24 J. Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 
(1985), pp. 223-511 at p. 243. 
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It is in the manager’s interests to impose rules with which the subjects can 
comply, even if the manager is in charge of a concentration camp.  The 
manager therefore has good reasons to comply with most of Fuller’s eight 
principles of the rule of law.  In the interests of efficiency, a manager will 
wish to issue directives which are communicated and which are ‘reasonably 
clear, free from contradiction, possible of execution and not changed so often 
as to frustrate the efforts of the subordinate to act on them.’25 The manager 
will not issue retrospective directives because ‘no manager retaining a 
semblance of sanity would direct his subordinate today to do something on his 
behalf yesterday’. 26  A manager may issue general rather than specific 
directives, but only if to do so is, in the particular case, more expedient.   
 
The big difference between a managerial order and a legal system is that a 
manager has no obligation to follow the rules which he himself has set.  Fuller 
argues that: 
 
‘the subordinate has no justification for complaint if, in a particular 
case, the superior directs him to depart from the procedures prescribed 
by some general order.  This means, in turn, that in managerial relation 
there is no room for a formal principle demanding that the actions of 
the superior conform to the rules he has himself announced’.27  
 
In a legal system, but not a managerial order, those with power are under an 
obligation to act in accordance with the rules.  Fuller writes:  
 
‘Surely the very essence of the Rule of Law is that in acting upon the 
citizen (by putting him in jail, for example, or declaring invalid a deed 
under which he claims title to property) a government will faithfully 
apply rules previously declared as those to be followed by the citizen 
                                                
25 Fuller, The Morality of Law, p. 208.   
26 Fuller, The Morality of Law, p. 209.  
27 Fuller, The Morality of Law, pp. 208-9.  
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and as being determinative of his rights and duties.  If the Rule of Law 
does not mean this, it means nothing.’28  
 
It is the fact that the rules are understood as binding both on the subject and on 
the ruler which is the distinguishing mark of the legal system.  This 
distinguishing feature has important consequences which go beyond giving 
the subjects a degree of protection against violence.  In a managerial order, the 
only person whose purposes matter is the manager.  In a legal system, the 
congruence between declared rules and official action means that its subjects 
are enabled to exercise their agency and to pursue their own purposes. 
 
D. The legal system 
The key distinctive of the rule of law is that the rulers count themselves as 
bound by the rules.  This was one of the main themes of Terry Pratchett’s 
writing.  In a magazine interview, he said:  
 
‘The thing about law is that it must apply to the king as well as the 
subjects.  Even if ultimately the rules don't apply to everybody, 
everybody must act as if they do and must obey them, whether their 
obedience is actually built in or they are choosing to obey them.’29 
 
Pratchett goes to absurd lengths to demonstrate that this is the case.  In his 
Discworld novels, the great city of Ankh-Morpork, is ruled over by a benign 
dictator, the Patrician.  The current Patrician, Lord Vetinari, educated at the 
Assassins’ Guild School, has encouraged the self-regulation of crime.  The 
Guild of Thieves regulates robberies and the Guild of Assassins murders.  The 
Guild of Thieves keeps crime to a particular level, although they have 
generally found it easier to extract an annual payment from each wealthy 
citizen of Ankh-Morpork rather than go to the trouble of actually burgling or 
                                                
28 Fuller, The Morality of Law, pp. 209-10.  
29 Terry Pratchett, interviewed in Third Way (June 2003), p. 18.  In Feet of Clay (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1996) at pp. 106-7 Sergeant Vimes reflects that ‘[The Guilds] even 
maintained the law … after a fashion.  Thieving without a licence was punishable by death for 
the first offence.  The Thieves’ Guild saw to that.  The arrangement sounded unreal, but it 
worked.’ 
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robbing them.30  With regard to murders, the Guild of Assassins will take care 
of any ‘inhumation’, subject to a fee.31  As for unauthorised attempts at 
robberies or murders, these are dealt with by the Guilds themselves.32   
 
Pratchett is well aware that the regulation of robberies and murders is not the 
same as the delivery of substantive justice.  In his novel Feet of Clay, Terry 
Pratchett has the Patrician explain that although people ‘think they want good 
government and justice for all, … what they really crave, deep in their hearts 
[is] [o]nly that things go on as normal and tomorrow is pretty much like 
today.’33 The job of the agents of the law is not therefore to right all the 
wrongs in the world.  It is the more limited task of ensuring that people are 
able to live with a degree of security and with a degree of freedom.34   
 
Outside of fantasy literature, John of Salisbury’s idea that the difference 
between lawful and unlawful rule is whether the ruler counts himself as bound 
by the law was picked up in the twentieth century by sociologist Georg 
Simmel35 and re-introduced to legal philosophy by Fuller as the idea that  
 
‘there is a kind of reciprocity between government and citizen with respect 
to the observance of rules.  Government says to the citizen in effect, 
“These are the rules we expect you to follow.  If you follow them, you 
have our assurance that they are the rules that will be applied to your 
conduct.” When this bond of reciprocity is finally and completely 
                                                
30 Pratchett, Men At Arms (London: Victor Gollancz, 1993), p. 13, 72.   
31 Pratchett, Pyramids (London: Corgi, 1990), pp. 43-44. 
32 Pratchett, Guards! Guards! (London: Corgi, 1990), pp. 44-46.   
33 Pratchett, Feet of Clay, p. 65. 
34 There is, of course, more than one way of assessing Pratchett’s message about the proper 
role of the police force who are, in the persons of Captain Carrot and Sergeant Vimes, the 
guardians of the law.  In a review of Night Watch, John Newsinger argues that the book has an 
anti-utopian message, about the importance of maintaining social order above all else, which 
marks an increasingly reactionary streak in Pratchett’s work: ‘The People’s Republic of 
Treacle Mine Road Betrayed: Terry Pratchett’s Night Watch’ Vector 232 (Nov/Dec 2003) 
pp.15-16.  Pratchett’s rejection of utopia seems to have two roots.  One is a cynicism about 
human nature, identified by Mendlesohn, ‘Faith and Ethics’, in Andrew M. Butler, Edward 
James and Farah Mendlesohn eds., Terry Pratchett: Guilty of Literature (Baltimore: Old 
Earth, 2nd edn., 2004), p.160, and the other is a more specific wariness about ‘authority figures 
and the corrupting influence of power’: see Sue Thomason’s review of Monstrous Regiment at 
p.29 in the same volume of Vector.  
35 G. Simmel, tr. Kurt H. Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, (The Free Press, 1950), p. 
186.  
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ruptured, nothing is left on which to ground the citizen’s duty to observe 
the rules.’36 
 
To the extent that a state determines to govern in accordance with the rule of 
law, to that extent its rulers agree to circumscribe their freedom of action and 
commit themselves to not using force which has not been authorised by law.  
The rule of law binds, either because both rulers and subjects act voluntarily in 
accordance with the law or, when that fails, because there are effective 
mechanisms which enforce the law.  
 
It is because the rule of law binds that it has the effects we identified in our 
thought experiment.  First, the rule of law protects subjects from violence by 
identifying the circumstances when force may be used against them by the 
rulers and by other subjects.  Second, the rule of law enables subjects to act as 
agents and to pursue their own purposes because they know how other 
subjects and the rulers are expected to behave.  Rules, whatever their 
substantive justice or injustice, promote the good of stabilizing expectations.  
This enables people to make sense of their lives and to identify areas, however 
large or small, in which they may exercise their own moral agency.  These two 
features of the rule of law are stabilised by a third feature, the establishment of 
law enforcement mechanisms which will punish unlawful violence and which 
will uphold subjects’ expectations.   
 
Law promotes our ability to pursue our own lives by outlining circumstances 
in which physical violence which interferes with our choices will not be 
tolerated, by specifying the legal consequences which will attend certain of 
our actions, and by identifying the behaviour of others on which we can 
reasonably rely when making our choices.  Therefore, Kristen Rundle argues, 
the rule of law ‘secures a certain quality of existence for those who live within 
it’.37 This security may be compatible, as Hart pointed out, with many kinds of 
                                                
36 Fuller, The Morality of Law, pp. 39-40; see also Tom Bingham ‘The Rule of Law’ 66 
Cambridge Law Journal (2007) p. 84.   
37 K. Rundle, ‘The Impossibility of an Exterminatory Legality: Law and the Holocaust’, 
University of Toronto Law Journal 59 (2009), pp. 107-8. 
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iniquity.38  Nonetheless, the legal system offers protection against unrestrained 
violence, both from itself and from others, in exchange for obedience to its 
rules.   
 
The rule of law therefore exists to the extent that legal rules are applied and 
followed in practice.39 This means that societies can be governed by the rule 
of law to a greater or lesser extent, and the World Bank Institute has 
developed a set of tools for measuring this.   
 
When the point is reached that citizens can no longer expect that others will 
follow the rules nor that others will be sanctioned if they fail to follow the 
rules, and can no longer expect that they will be protected from violence if 
they follow the rules, then the rule of law has collapsed.  What is left is not 
enforcement of the law but rather acts of violence. It is a return to the 
Hobbesian state of nature in which officials simply have a comparative 
advantage in terms of violence.  In a provocative and worrying book, Gary A. 
Haugen and Victor Boutros argue that this is the reality for half a billion 
people today.40 In many places around the world, significant progress towards 
the reduction of absolute poverty and outrageous inequality would be achieved 
if the poorest and most vulnerable were able to count on the protection which 
existing laws are supposed to offer them against violence, expropriation and 
other forms of coercion and exploitation. 
 
IV. The rule of law as the reflection of God’s law-like nature 
To be subject to the rule of law is to be subject to rulers who count themselves 
as bound by the rules, to enjoy the protection of knowing in what 
circumstances you may be subject to violence, and to have the space to 
exercise your agency and pursue your own purposes. 
 
                                                
38 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 207. 
39 N. MacCormick, ‘The Ethics of Legalism’, Ratio Juris 2 (1989), p. 191. 
40 Gary A. Haugen and Victor Boutros, The Locust Effect: Why the End of Poverty requires 
the End of Violence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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This understanding of the rule of law ought to illuminate our understanding of 
what it is to be subject to God’s law.  The Christian God is, in God-self, law-
like.  As Aquinas convincingly argues, God is, in a proper and unique sense, a 
law unto God-self.  Aquinas names God’s own law the eternal law. 
 
For Aquinas, the doctrine of divine simplicity means that ‘the end or telos of 
divine government is God himself, and his law is nothing other than 
himself’.41 The telos of the universe is to be found in the subsistent goodness 
of God (ST I.103.2). Thus ‘the eternal law which is nothing other than God 
himself, nothing other than the divine light in which the blessed see God’ is 
the controlling category within which the natural law, Mosaic Law and the 
New Law of the Gospel are all only properly understood.42  
 
The affirmation that God is a law unto God-self does not prevent God from 
doing new things in time but it does mean that God is reliable.  One of the 
important features of the Christian understanding of God as impassible, and 
the one surely worth retaining (because it is intrinsic to the affirmation of 
God’s aseity) even if the other aspects of the doctrine are discarded, is the 
affirmation that the Christian God is not like the Greek gods, that God is not 
capricious but faithful and constant. 
 
Aquinas resolves any contradiction between God’s law-like nature and God’s 
freedom to act in time arguing that the eternal law is the law ‘ordered by God 
for the governance of things foreknown by him’, 43 to be equated with God’s 
providence, provided this is understood in the broadest terms as the entirety of 
God’s good purposes for this world that He has created (ST I-II.91.1).  God’s 
rule is for the good of God’s creatures and encompasses both God’s 
‘conservation of things in the good and their motion toward the good.’44 
 
                                                
41 F. Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 106. 
42 Kerr, After Aquinas, p. 106. 
43 Aquinas ST I-II, 91, 1 ad.1, see also 93; J.P. Torrell, tr. Robert Royal, Saint Thomas 
Aquinas Vol. II, Spiritual Master (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 
2003), p. 283. 
44 Torrell, Aquinas Vol. II, p.235, italics in the original.  
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At ST I-II.93.4-6, Aquinas presents his argument that God and the eternal law 
are identical in trinitarian terms. It is possible to say more about the eternal 
law than that it is the character and therefore ipso facto the purposes of the 
Father.  Thus, at ST I-II.93.4 ad.2 he says ‘the Son of God is not subject to the 
eternal law: but rather is himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation’.45 
‘The eternal law embodies all that is true, just and good in relationship to God, 
that is, the law of love, and it is the Word himself who eternally embodies and 
so lives out this law.’46 At q.93.6 ad.1, the Holy Spirit too is equated with, 
rather than regarded as subject to, the eternal law.47 It is the Spirit who leads 
created things to their appointed end. All of which suggests that a Christian 
doctrine of providence must be conceived in trinitarian terms – as overseen by 
the Father, ordered to the Son and accomplished in the Spirit.  
 
The rule of law is reflected in the biblical presentation of the events of 
creation and redemption. The Genesis accounts of a rationally ordered 
creation rule out the possibility of conceiving of God’s rule as a senseless 
order devoid of discernable purposes.  I take it to be established beyond 
serious argument that Christian thinkers like William of Conches (1085-
c.1154) and Thomas Aquinas laid the foundations for modern science with 
their belief that a law-like God had created a world whose regularities could 
be observed.48 
 
The distinction between a slave state and a legal system throws the Exodus 
event into sharp relief.  The Israelites were slaves in Egypt, without protection 
against violence (of which the population control methods with which the 
book of Exodus begins are a prime example) and exploited to serve Pharaoh’s 
purposes.  In contrast, the Old Testament resonates with the declaration 
‘YHWH Melek’, the Lord is King.  Israel’s God is not a tyrant.  God has 
                                                
45  See also Aquinas, ST I-II.93.1 ad.2; 93.4. resp., ad.2. 
46 T. G. Weinandy, ‘The Supremacy of Christ: Aquinas’ Commentary on Hebrews’ in 
Weinandy, Keating and Yocum eds., Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to his Biblical 
Commentaries (London: T&T Clark, 2005), p. 228. 
47 See also Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, 20, n. 3572. 
48 James Hannam, God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World laid the foundations of 
Modern Science (London: Icon Books, 2009). 
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given Israel a law and has bound God-self, through a covenant with God’s 
people, to act faithfully and for their good.   
 
What is more, the Bible consistently affirms that God’s governance of human 
beings is not a managerial order in which God’s laws are issued for God’s 
benefit without regard for what is good for human beings.  On the contrary, 
because God is good and because God is love, God’s law is given through 
progressive revelation to enable human beings to discover their own good. 
 
Aquinas’s understanding of God as law-like is opposed by a theological 
position which insists on the primacy of God’s freedom of action over the 
impossibility of God acting otherwise than in conformity with God’s 
character.  Richard Mouw has, however, argued that Reformed adherents to 
this position in fact end up at the same place in their understanding of God’s 
relations to human beings because of the role which the idea of covenant plays 
in their thought.  Thus, even in Reformed thought at its most voluntarist, ‘a 
divine will that seems for all the world to be thoroughly arbitrary turns out to 
be bound by a commitment to lawful activity and covenantal fidelity’.49  
Whereas for Aquinas, God is bound to act lawfully in se; for most Calvinists 
God has bound God-self by covenant to act lawfully. 
 
One of the important features of the rule of law is the way in which it renders 
tolerable rule by fallible, even by bad human rulers.  More than that, however, 
the rule of law reflects the character of God’s rule of the universe.  Christian 
theology should affirm that God is a law unto God-self, that God has bound 
God-self to humankind through covenants, that God has exercised God’s rule 
over creation through the revelation of God’s law through creation and the 
Scriptures, culminating in Jesus Christ who is both the Law and the law-giver 
in person. This understanding of God has, as its corollaries, an account of the 
space for human responsibility and free-will.  It is because God is constant 
that human beings are freed to take responsible action in the world.  Humans 
are not the helpless victims of fatum and fortuna.  It is because God is law-
                                                
49 Richard J. Mouw, The God Who Commands: A Study in Divine Command Ethics (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) pp. 4, 100. 
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like, that God has revealed to human beings what God requires and what will 
incur God’s wrath. 
 
Through the practices of law, human rule reflects divine rule by specifying the 
good, by protecting against evil, and by enabling personal agency, so that 
those who are subject to it are able to take their own initiative and to pursue 
their own goals within an ordered social framework in which good and evil 
are distinguished and violence is restrained.  Rulers are called to imitate God’s 
law-like character, not to ape God’s majesty or to arrogate to themselves 
God’s prerogatives. 
 
V. The relationship between the rule of law and justice 
I observed at the beginning of this paper that conceptions of the rule of law 
vary from thin, formal versions to thick, substantive versions.  There is a 
noticeable tendency amongst contemporary legal theorists, including those 
who claim to be legal positivists, to move from a thin conception towards one 
which makes larger claims about the virtues of the rule of law. 
 
The reason why this tendency is intrinsic to the concept of the rule of law is 
because the purpose of the rule of law is to bind rulers and subjects.  Because 
it is difficult to devise adequate enforcement mechanisms which bind rulers 
effectively, the rule of law is more secure if the rulers act voluntarily in 
accordance with the rule of law.  Because it is costly and inefficient to have to 
enforce the rules coercively, it is in the interests of rulers to secure their 
subjects’ voluntary co-operation.   
 
The robber state, even if its ruling class could discipline themselves to comply 
with the formal requirements of the rule of law, would still not have imposed 
law on their subjects because of their failure to give their subjects any moral, 
as opposed to prudential, reason for obedience.  In order for a system of rules 
to generate a prima facie moral obligation of obedience, its rulers must at least 
pretend that the rules are just.  Thus the rule of law exposes rulers to the 
critique that those claims are misplaced, hypocritical or just plain false.   
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In order to secure voluntary obedience, it is in rulers’ interests to give an 
account of why the rules are binding on their subjects.  Thus Alexy argues, 
where a legal system exists, rulers claim that the rules are justified. 50 
MacCormick agrees that: ‘Someone who openly claimed to rule only by brute 
power and without regard to any rational scheme of value could not be 
understood to be ruling through, far less under, law.’51 The rulers claim that 
their rules are authoritative and should therefore be followed voluntarily by 
their subjects. 52  The ‘laws are intended to prescribe our conduct, and 
statements about legal rights and duties draw conclusions about what ought to 
be done, or what is justified, in the light of such prescriptions.’53  
 
I want now to discuss three implications of the proposition that the rule of law 
requires rulers to justify the rules, i.e. to give an account of why the rules are 
binding on their subjects. 
 
First, because the rule of law enables us to identify the rules which govern a 
society, and places rulers under an imperative to claim that those rules are 
binding because they are just, the rule of law facilitates a conversation about 
whether the rules are in fact just.  In a society governed by the rule of law, it is 
possible for the subjects to engage with the rulers in debate about the justice of 
the rules by which they are governed. 
 
Second, the requirement to justify the rules supports the view that there are 
circumstances in which serious injustice is committed unlawfully.  I do not 
mean to be sanguine about this:  law, which uses force in the name of justice 
to restrain lawless violence, can and often has become the servant of injustice.  
Where, however, there is a commitment to law, it is the servant of unjust goals 
pursued by defined means and methods.  It is at least an official statement of 
                                                
50 Fuller, The Morality of Law, pp. 209-10.  
51 MacCormick, ‘Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals’, in R.P. George ed. 
Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) pp. 105-
133 at p. 120. 
52 Rivers, ‘The Living Rule of Law’, p.14. 
53 Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea, p. 119.   
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the circumstances in which violence and injustice will occur.  There is a moral 
gain, however slight, in the making of such a statement. 
 
Graver dangers come because of the capacity of societies to regard certain 
categories of people as objects rather than subjects and to exclude them from 
the protection of the rule of law.  Thus, the institution of chattel-slavery is 
built upon brute power.  Similarly, the destruction of the Jews after 
Kristallnacht was achieved by treating them as non-persons, as objects, not 
entitled to any protection from violence.54  As Martin Chalmers chillingly puts 
it, from Kristallnacht on, ‘Jews realize[d] that there is no one and nothing to 
protect them.’55  
 
Third, it explains why Christian natural law theory gave the answer it did to 
the question: if a law is not binding, is it a law at all?  For Christian natural 
law theory, the rule of law is not just a thin conception of using the proper 
procedure and forms to change the law.  The rule of law is also the thick 
conception of adopting rules which are lawful, i.e. which are sufficiently 
justified to be binding on the conscience of those who are subject to them.  
The rule of law is about a certain quality of rule.  Christian natural law theory 
understood political rule as having been given for the protection and 
development of the common good, and as subject to the divine rule-making of 
God in nature and in Scripture.  
 
Augustine, in his early dialogue On Free Choice of the Will, had made one of 
his protagonists say: Nam lex mihi esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit 
(“For a law that was not just would not seem to me to be a law”).56 Aquinas 
cited Augustine’s dictum in the Summa Theologiae I-II. Q.95 arts 2 and 4, in 
preparation for his discussion in Q.96 art. 4 of the question, “Whether Human 
Law Binds a Man in Conscience?” 
  
                                                
54 K. Rundle, ‘The Impossibility of an Exterminatory Legality’, p. 65-125. 
55 M. Chalmers ‘Preface to Victor Klemperer, I Will Bear Witness: A Diary of the Nazi Years 
1933-1941.’ Tr. Martin Chalmers.  (New York: Random House, 1998), p. xiv.   
56 There is an obvious tension between this dictum and Augustine’s later position that human 
justice was so far removed from divine justice that it was not worthy to be called by the same 
name.  
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For Aquinas, a ruler who rules solely in his own interest (Aquinas ST II-
II.42.2 ad.3) as King John did, was a tyrant even if his laws met all the formal 
requirements.57 A rule which had been adopted according to the correct 
procedure and which was in the proper form was nonetheless unlawful if was 
so unjust that it fell outside the scope of the authority which the ruler had 
under God.  
 
Understood in this way, Christian natural law theory claims that law, though 
and precisely because it binds, should protect against violence, enable agency 
and invite voluntary obedience.  Laws make effective agency possible by 
contributing to the structure, to the framework, within which individual 
decision-making is made possible and given meaning.58  Laws make social 
relationships between what Fuller calls ‘friendly strangers’59  possible by 
establishing basic expectations which people can have of one another.  By so 
doing, rules also create areas of meaningful freedom in which people are able 
to plan and act because they know what they can expect from others and what 
is expected of them.    
 
By focussing on whether laws bind in conscience, Christian natural law theory 
critiques laws which are unjust as defective examples of the species.  It draws 
our attention away from the question which we have considered today: what 
does it mean to say something is lawful?, towards the deeper question: is the 
action just?   
 
VI. Conclusions 
A sober acknowledgement of the limits of law is inherent to Christianity’s 
DNA.  A major burden of my work as a theologian of law has been to argue 
that Christianity puts law firmly in its place.  The doctors of the Church, Paul, 
Augustine and Aquinas all teach that law, even divinely given law, is not 
                                                
57 King John’s rule showed ‘little regard for due process, custom or basic principles of 
fairness’: Andrew, The Church and the Charter, pp. 13-14. 
58 O’Donovan, The Ways of Judgment, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), p. 68.  
59 Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and the Law’, American Journal of Jurisprudence 14 (1969) pp. 
1-36 at p. 27. 
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sufficient to deliver justice.60  Our inability to follow God’s law, to live 
lawfully,61 exposes our need for a Saviour and our dependence on the Holy 
Spirit. 
 
Nonetheless, Christian natural law theory has affirmed the rule of law as more 
than an a-moral instrument of governance without concluding that it is a 
guarantee of substantive justice.  The rule of law is a limit on power because it 
requires rulers to comply with formal requirements which give subjects 
warning of when violence will be used against them.  This commitment to 
rules creates space in which subjects can act as effective agents.  The 
imperative to secure as much voluntary obedience to the rules as possible 
leads rulers to offer justifications of why the rules are binding and this makes 
possible a critique and debate about whether the rules are in fact just. 
 
The early legal positivists, John Austin and Hans Kelsen presented a distorted 
understanding of law as intrinsically coercive, mistaking force as the 
substance of law rather than an accident of it.  H.L.A. Hart rightly rejected that 
account62 but wrongly insisted that the Nazi regime was guilty of enacting bad 
laws and not also of a serious degradation of the rule of law without which 
some of its worst excesses may not have been possible.63 
 
As befits the occasion, I have made an academic case for the relative, but 
indispensable, importance of the rule of law for the good governance and 
prospering of human societies.  Haugen and Boutros in The Locust Effect 
make a far more effective plea for the urgent need to make every endeavour to 
                                                
60 McIlroy, A Biblical View of Law and Justice (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2003); A Trinitarian 
Theology of Law.  
61 McIlroy, ‘The Law of Love’ Cambridge Papers 17(2) (2008); Rivers, ‘The Living Rule of 
Law’. 
62 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 20-25. 
63 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, Harvard Law Review 71 
(1958), p.593; K. Rundle, in Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L. Fuller 
(Oxford: Hart, 2012), pp. 66-78, points out how Gustav Radbruch moved from a legal 
positivist position before World War II to a natural law position because of his assessment 
that ‘the positivist insistence on the separation of law and morality had powerfully contributed 
to the horrors of the era and especially to the failure of the German legal profession “to protest 
against the enormities which they were required to perpetrate in the name of law”.’, at p.66. 
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deliver the benefits of the rule of the law to half a billion of the poorest and 
most vulnerable people on our planet.   
 
Their plea is supported by data from the World Bank Institute which shows 
that an improvement of one standard deviation in the rule of law produces a 
three-fold increase in incomes and a two-thirds reduction in infant mortality. 
That is the gap between respectively Somalia and Cote d’Ivoire, Cote d’Ivoire 
and El Salvador, El Salvador and Italy, and Italy and the United Kingdom.64   
 
In his recent work, Justice in Love, Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that love and 
justice are necessarily not incompatible.65 Rightly understood, justice has its 
place within love. Love he defines in terms of care: to love someone is to 
promote the goods in her life as an end in itself. Glossing Wolterstorff, might 
we venture to say that the rule of law serves the ends of love by protecting 
subjects against violence and by enabling them to pursue goods as responsible 
agents.  
 
I think all this can be said without denying for one moment that law has been 
used as a force of oppression throughout history, that people have been treated 
as objects not subjects by legal systems which have in effect denied their 
humanity, that the poor have been denied the protection in practice that the 
law offered them in theory.  Indeed, I would go further and claim that it is a 
belief in a God of justice, who is law-like in nature, which provides the 
strongest resources for a critique of the injustices committed both within and 
without law.  Moreover, knowing that we are accountable to such a God gives 
us the clearest incentive to regard ourselves as bound by what is morally right, 
whether or not there is a law against an unjust action and whether or not any 
such law is likely to be enforced against us. 
                                                
64 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp, accessed on 28 August 2015.  One of 
my worries is that the recent cuts in legal aid leave many people unable to access a lawyer to 
vindicate their rights. Such people are then dependent on voluntary obedience to the rule of 
law by the powerful.  I fear that unless the cuts are reversed or alternative agencies act on 
behalf of these people, even within the UK we may see significant numbers of people 
deprived of the benefit of the rule of law: see further Andrew Caplen and David McIlroy, 
Speaking Up: Defending and Delivering Access to Justice (London: Theos, 2015). 
65 N. Wolterstorff, Justice in Love, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011). 
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